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Abstract 
Rescue seeks to preserve the going concern in a financially distressed but potentially 
viable business. It aims, on one hand, to maximise the value in distressed businesses 
and, on the other, to give potentially viable but distressed businesses the opportunity of 
a second chance. In England and Wales, the main rescue process is structured to strive 
for the former but pays relatively little attention to the latter. The mechanisms which 
have been introduced to maximise the prospects of the achieving a going-concern sale 
have been associated with the subsequent failure of the rescued business. It appears, 
therefore, that there is a discord between value maximisation and the survivability of 
rescued businesses. In 2015, the Graham review sought to alleviate this discord by 
proposing the voluntary independent viability report and viability statement. While this 
article agrees with the reforms to the extent that they encourage due consideration for 
the future survival of rescued businesses, it argues that the requirements ought to be 
mandatory. Further, that the buyer should be required to demonstrate that the amount of 
leverage carried forward and the time-span for repayment are calculated with due 
consideration for the earning capacity of the rescued business and its own operational 
needs.  
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An Invitation to Encourage Due Consideration for the Survivability of Rescued 
Businesses in the Business Rescue System of England and Wales 
Bolanle Adebola 
Overview 
Business rescue connotes giving a financially distressed but potentially viable entity a 
second chance to succeed, by preserving the going-concern. On one hand, rescue aims 
to maximise the value in distressed businesses for the benefit of the pre-distress 
stakeholders; on the other, it seeks to give potentially viable but distressed businesses 
the opportunity of a second chance. It is not expected that the business is saved from 
outright failure merely to fail shortly afterwards - which will be referred to as 
recidivism. Recidivism erodes the economic and social benefits of going-concern 
preservation. Its costs are disproportionately borne by the sub-set of stakeholders who 
stand to lose the most from the failure of the business, to wit: it undermines the second 
chance granted to entrepreneurs and the benefits of the job preservation given to 
employees;1 trade creditors not only receive little or nothing from the failure, they also 
lose a trading partner; the economy in general suffers the loss of a potentially valuable 
contributor. Ultimately, recidivism erodes trust in the rescue system.2  
                                                 
 Dr Bolanle Adebola is a lecturer in International Commercial Law at the School of Law, University of 
Reading. Foxhill House, Whiteknights road, Earley, RG6 7BA. b.adebola@reading.ac.uk. Many thanks to 
the referees for their comments. I would also like to thank Professor Gerard McCormack, Professor Jay 
Westbrook, Dr Jorge Guira, Professor Adrian Walters and those who attended the INSOL Academics 
conference Sydney, for their helpful comments.  
1 The Insolvency Service, Productivity and Enterprise: Insolvency – A Second Chance Cmnd 5234 
(2001).  
2 Bully Banks http://www.bully-banks.co.uk/; J. Guthrie, ‘Debt Dodgers Revel in Return of the Phoenix’ 
(Financial Times, January 21, 2009).  
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In England and Wales, the ‘noise’ about the failings of the aspects3 of the rescue system 
prompted an independent review commissioned by the government in 2014 which will 
be referred to as the Graham review.4  In addition to addressing issues relating to the 
transparency of aspects of the rescue process, the Graham review responded, for the 
first time, to the problem of recidivism which was first identified but not considered in 
an earlier investigation in 2007.5 An empirical study commissioned by the Graham 
review -the Wolverhampton study - found that majority of the businesses that failed 
subsequently were characterised by going concern sales to persons with previous 
connections6 to the distressed entity and going-concern sales aided by deferred7 
consideration.8  
To reduce the likelihood of recidivism, the Graham review proposed reforms which 
came into effect in November 2015 and with which this article is concerned.9 The 
article argues that the orientation of the reforms sows the seeds for a more expansive 
view of the business rescue process. They encourage consideration for the future 
survival of the rescued business, a view with which this article agrees. The rescue 
process ought to consider both the maximisation of value for pre-distress stakeholders 
and the prospective survival of the rescued entity for a considerable period thereafter. 
When one examines the pre-2015 rescue system in England and Wales however, one 
                                                 
3 Discussed below in Section B.  
4 Department for Business Innovation and Skills, Transparency & Trust: Enhancing the Transparency of 
UK Company Ownership and Increasing Trust in UK Business: Discussion Paper (2013). 
5 T Graham CBE, ‘Graham Review into Pre-pack Administration: Report to the Rt Hon Vince Cable MP, 
(June 2014); S Frisby, ‘Report to the Association of Business Recovery Professionals: A Preliminary 
Analysis of Pre-Packaged Administrations’ (2007), 
https://www.r3.org.uk/media/documents/publications/press/preliminary_analysis_of_pre-
packed_administrations.pdf, 79.  
6 See p10 below.  
7 See p10 below.  
8 n 5 above, A4.1.1, B4.1.1.1. Discussed further in Section C below.   
9 Section C below.  
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finds that it is structured, mainly, to promote the maximisation of value for the pre-
distress stakeholders but is relatively quiet on the survivability of the rescued entity. If 
the rescue process is to achieve its wider economic and social goals, then it ought also 
to facilitate the sustained survival of rescued businesses; hence, the importance of 
measures aimed at reducing the likelihood of recidivism.    
To that end, the Graham review recommended that the buyer should present or explain 
its failure to present an independent viability report.10 Further, that the buyer should 
present or explain its failure to present a viability statement which outlines the reasons 
for the failure and the changes to be made to remedy them.11 The reforms apply in a 
specific context, namely, where there was a business rescue through a pre-packaged12 
administration13 in which the buyer is connected to the distressed entity. It made no 
recommendation in relation to deferred consideration, however. It is at this point that 
this article departs from the Graham review and its reforms. It argues that a clear 
determination of the amount of leverage that can be carried forward successfully by the 
business is also fundamental to its survival. Hence, there is the need to extend the 
reforms to the use of deferred consideration. The buyer ought to demonstrate that the 
stated sum and repayment plan are calculated with due regard for the earning capacity 
of the rescued business and its own operational requirements.14  Further, The article 
                                                 
10 See p 11 below.  
11 See p11 below.  
12 See p 7 below.  
13 See p6 below.  
14 Section D. 
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argues for a more stringent approach. It argues that the requirements ought to be 
obligatory, not voluntary.15  
It may be argued that the introduction of additional requirements to the rescue process 
will complicate the rescue process and introduce additional costs at a point when the 
distressed entity has little or no funds available to it. In response, it is argued that the 
managers of distressed entities are already encouraged to undertake independent 
investigations and seek independent advice in the course of rescue.16 The proposals 
merely require them to demonstrate that they have. It is expected that the previously-
connected persons would be able to access the necessary funds to cover their costs if 
they can demonstrate a viable business and workable plan to potential lenders and 
investors. In addition, considering that almost 40% of the businesses rescued with the 
use of deferred consideration fail again, it is important to ensure that the buyer obtains 
independent and relevant advice during the negotiations; particularly because the 
insolvency practitioner is not obliged to negotiate in the interests of the buyer or the 
future of the rescued business. Her goal is to maximise the value accruing to the pre-
distress stakeholders, even if the deal is detrimental to the rescued business.17 
Ultimately, the proposals seek to encourage the buyers to take a pro-active and objective 
approach to business rescue than is presently the case.   
The article is divided into 6 sections. Section B sets out a brief overview of the 
development and orientation of the main business rescue procedures in England and 
                                                 
15 Section E.  
16SIP 16, paragraph 7, 
https://www.r3.org.uk/media/documents/technical_library/SIPS/SIP%2016%20Version%203%20Nov%2
02015.pdf accessed 06/12/2016. 
17 Insolvency Act 1986, Schedule B1, para 3(2).   
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Wales. Section C discusses the links between the rights of lenders and the rescue 
system. It discusses the modern challenges faced at business rescue in England and 
Wales today, as set out by the Graham review and outlines the reforms proposed as 
remedy. Section D discusses the relevance of the reforms to the rescue process. It 
adduces reasons why the buyer ought to be required to demonstrate that it has received 
independent relevant advice on the main issues which have been identified: viability, 
operational plan and leverage carried forward. Section E introduces suggestions that are 
believed, would improve the effectiveness of the business rescue system. Section F sets 
out the conclusions. Essentially, it reiterates its argument for a broader look at the 
rescue process and the introduction of elements which would encourage due 
consideration for the future survival of the rescued business.  
A. An Overview of Business Rescue in England and Wales  
In England and Wales, the rescue concept was formally introduced into the insolvency 
system on the recommendation of the Cork committee.18 The committee advocated for 
the preservation of distressed businesses that can contribute to the economy.19 For that 
reason, the insolvency system and culture were reformed to encourage rescue through a 
suite of rescue processes including the administrative receivership procedure,20 the 
administration procedure21 and the company voluntary arrangement.22 Administrative 
receivership became the most pervasive business rescue mechanism in the following 
                                                 
18 Insolvency Law and Practice: Report of the Review Committee Cmnd 8558 (1982).  
19 Ibid, Chapter 4, [53].  
20 Insolvency Act 1986, Part III, s 42 – s45.  
21 Insolvency Act 1986, Part II.  
22 Insolvency Act 1986, Part 1.  
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decade.23 It finds its roots in the contractual remedies afforded to the holder of 
proprietary rights in the debtor’s assets.24 It can only be initiated by the secured creditor 
with proprietary rights over the whole or substantially the whole of the debtor’s assets 
where those rights include rights granted by a floating charge; to be referred to as the 
senior lender in this article.25 The procedure is contractual and executed 
administratively; requiring minimal court involvement.26 The appointee must be an 
insolvency practitioner.27  
To facilitate the execution of her duties, the administrative receiver is contractually 
endowed with management powers, including the default provisions set out in schedule 
1 to the Insolvency Act 1986. The goal is to maximise the value in the assets. In 
principle, at least, the administrative receiver is to decide whether value is best 
maximised by liquidation or by the preservation of the going concern.28 Nevertheless, 
she is not obliged to run the business or sell it as a going concern, even though she 
would usually have the power to do so.29  Her duty is to act in the best interests of her 
appointor.30 The administrative receiver is not accountable to the other stakeholders in 
the distressed entity. While she has the duty to report on some matters to the unsecured 
creditors, she cannot be instructed by them; neither is she required to consider their 
                                                 
2323 The Insolvency Service, ‘Receiverships, Administrations and Company Voluntary Arrangements in 
England and Wales, 1987 to Present’ 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140311023846/http:/www.insolvencydirect.bis.gov.uk/other
information/statistics/historicdata/HDmenu.htm (last assessed 04/04/2017).  
24 Gaskell v Gosling[1896] 1 QB, 669. 
25 Insolvency Act 1986, s 29 (2).  
26 S Davydenko and J. Franks, ‘Do bankruptcy codes matter? A study of defaults in France, Germany and 
the UK’, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=647861.  
27 Insolvency Act 1986, s230(2). 
28 Cork on Cork: Sir Kenneth Cork takes Stock with Hugh Barty-King (Macmillan London, 1988). 
29 Downsview Nominees Ltd [1993] 3 All ER 626; Medforth v Blake [1999] BCC 771.  
30 re B Johnson & Co (Builders) Ltd [1955] Ch. 634. 
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interests when executing her functions.31 Her appointment displaces the pre-distress 
management of the distressed entity.32 At best, they can exercise functions delegated to 
them or powers which the receiver declines to enforce.  
In practice, administrative receivership usually led to the outcome which was preferred 
by the senior lender.33 This fact has attracted differing views by experts in the field. 
Armour and Frisby are proponents of the view that the advantages of the administrative 
receivership process were under-appreciated.34 They have pointed to the control powers 
given to the senior lender as a principal advantage of the procedure.35 They have argued 
that the wealth of information obtained through the extensive monitoring powers 
granted contractually to the senior lender, as well as its ability to effectively channel the 
information gathered into decisive actions on the timely commencement, choice of 
administrative receiver and a clearly determined outcome cumulatively reduced the 
costs of corporate distress.  
Nevertheless, the practice was heavily criticised by others who focused on the perverse 
incentives of the administrative receiver.36 It has been demonstrated that the 
administrative receiver was obliged to pursue the strategy preferred by the senior lender 
if she was to garner future appointments.37 Mokal argued that this strategy resulted in 
                                                 
31 Insolvency Act 1986, s 48, s49; Downsview Nominees Ltd [1993] 3 All ER 626. 
32 Gomba Holdings UK Ltd v Homan (1986) 1 WLR 1301.  
33 Office of Fair Trading, ‘The market for corporate insolvency practitioners: A market study’ (June 
2010) 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140402142426/http:/www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/reports/Ins
olvency/oft1245 accessed 13/12/2016.  
34 J Armour and S Frisby, ‘Rethinking Receivership’ [2001] 21 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 733.  
35 Ibid, 86-91. 
36 Department of Trade and Industry, A Review of Company Rescue and Business Reconstruction 
Mechanisms (2000).  
37 Office of Fair Trading, ‘The market for corporate insolvency practitioners: A market study’ (June 
2010) 
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the undue liquidation of distressed entities that may otherwise have been rescued.38 In 
his view, the senior lender would only push for the preservation of the going concern 
where it was unlikely to recover the value of its loan in full. The decision whether or not 
to preserve the going concern was based not on the professional judgement of the 
practitioner but on the proclivities of her appointor. The higher the likelihood that the 
senior lender could recover in full even with a piece-meal sale, the lower the prospect of 
going concern preservation. Consequently, it was alleged that the focus on the economic 
interests of the senior lenders trumped the economic and social interests of other 
stakeholders to the detriment of value-maximization. 
On account of the criticisms, the government opted to reform the insolvency law to 
promote greater balance in the interest of a wider group of stakeholders, as the new 
millennium rolled in.39 The government at the time encouraged changes along the path 
of the rescue system of the United States which is generally perceived to have a debtor-
oriented system and a strong rescue ethic.40 The reforms came within the broader policy 
of promoting entrepreneurship and the preservation of jobs for the ultimate growth of 
the economy.41 It followed that by 2003, reforms to the rescue system saw the 
administrative receivership process largely restricted.42 The administration procedure, 
                                                                                                                                               
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140402142426/http:/www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/reports/Ins
olvency/oft1245.  
38 R Mokal, ‘The Harm Done by Administrative Receivership’ 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=568702 last accessed 11/12/2016, 4-6.  
39 I Fletcher, ‘UK Corporate Rescue: Recent Developments – Changes to Administrative Receivership, 
Administration, and Company Voluntary Arrangements – The Insolvency Act 2000, The White Paper 
2001, and the Enterprise Act 2002’ (2004) 5 European Business Organization Law Review 119.  
40 G McCormack, ‘Control and Corporate Rescue – An Anglo-American Evaluation’ (2007) 56 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 515.  
41 n 1 above, 2.1. 
42 Insolvency Act 1986, Part III, Chapter IV, s 72A.  
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formerly a court-reliant rescue process executed on behalf of the stakeholders as a 
whole, was streamlined and promoted to the role of the rescue option of choice.43  
Today, the administration procedure can be initiated in or out of court by a number of 
actors including the directors and the senior lender.44 In principle, by enabling the 
directors to initiate rescue out of court, they would exercise potent control rights. Given 
that the appointment of the administrator does not completely remove them from office, 
it was expected they would welcome the chance to initiate the rescue mechanism in a 
timely-fashion and appoint an administrator of their choice. Both factors would in turn 
boost the chances of successful rescue.  
In the spirit of going-concern preservation, the primary objective of the administrator is 
to rescue the company.45 It is only where the administrator thinks that the company 
cannot be rescued, or that a better outcome can be achieved for the creditors that other 
ends can be prioritised. The next objective of the administrator would be to achieve a 
better outcome than would have been achieved if the company had not gone first into 
administration.46 In principle, the administrator would try to maximise value by 
negotiating a going-concern sale. Where the administrator thinks that neither of the first 
two objectives can be achieved, or that undue harm will not be done to the other 
creditors, then administration may be commenced merely to make distributions to a sub-
set of the stakeholders of the debtor company.47 In practice, the streamlined 
                                                 
43 n 1 above, 2.7-2.17. 
44 Insolvency Act 1986, Schedule B1, Para 12, Para 14, Para 22.  
45 Ibid, Para 3 (1) (a).  
46 Ibid, Para 3 (1) (b), (3). 
47 Ibid, Para 3 (1) (c), (4).  
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administration does not rescue companies, however.48 At best, it seeks to achieve a 
better outcome for the creditors than might have been otherwise attained. The ultimate 
goal is therefore value-maximisation for the pre-distress creditors. 
The administrator is to perform her tasks in the interest of all the creditors as a whole.49 
The administrator is accountable to the unsecured creditors, who vote on her proposals 
and may seek redress against decisions that have been or will be taken.50 However, a 
practice which became known as the pre-pack which had quietly been gaining traction 
shortly after the new Act went into force, came into its own in the post-reform era.51 
The first detailed investigation into the pre-packed administration procedure set the 
percentage of pre-packs upwards of 35.5%.52 The 2014 investigation into pre-packed 
administrations shows that they account for the greatest proportion of going-concern 
sales.53 
Essentially, the pre-pack finds its roots in the proprietary remedies granted to the senior 
lender by contract.54 Unlike with the usual administration procedure in which the 
administrator is expected to determine the outcome of each case after appointment, the 
outcome of the pre-packed administration is decided before a formal insolvency process 
                                                 
48 S Frisby, ‘Report on Insolvency Outcomes’ (2006), 58.  
49 Ibid, Para 3(2). 
50 Ibid, Para 49, Para 53.  
51 Discussed further in Section B. 
52 S Frisby, ‘Report to the Association of Business Recovery Professionals: A Preliminary Analysis of 
Pre-Packaged Administrations’ (2007), 
https://www.r3.org.uk/media/documents/publications/press/preliminary_analysis_of_pre-
packed_administrations.pdf, (accessed 09/04/2017), Part 1, 15.  
53 P Walton and C Umfreville, Pre-pack Empirical Research: Characteristic and Outcome Analysis of Pre-
Pack Administration, 85. 
54 V Finch, ‘Pre-Packaged Administrations: Bargains in the Shadow of Insolvency or Shadowy 
Bargains?’(2006) JBL, 568. 
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is initiated. The practitioner is appointed principally to formally implement it.55 The 
process is concluded without the presentation of proposals to or input from the 
unsecured creditors; scaling back the participatory right administration grants to them.56 
The process does not require an order of the court to be valid.57 In essence, the pre-pack 
functionally replaces the administrative receivership procedure which the government 
sought to restrict with the 2002 reforms.58  
Like administrative receivership, the pre-pack procedure is regarded with suspicion by 
some and has been criticised for excluding the participatory rights of unsecured 
creditors.59 Over the years, the government has sought to improve both its transparency 
and credibility. To that end, the Statement of Insolvency Practice 16 (SIP 16) was 
introduced in 2009.60 Statements of Insolvency Practice are guidance notes issued to 
help insolvency practitioners maintain standards in the insolvency practice. SIP 16 
obligates the practitioner to provide information about the pre-pack sale to unsecured 
creditors after its conclusion. There is no liability attached to the breach of the 
statements.  
 
 
                                                 
55 Re T&D Industries [2000] 1 BCLC 471; Re Transbus International [2004] EWHC 932 (Ch). 
56 P Walton, ‘Pre-packaged Administration – Trick or Treat?’ (2006) Insolvency Intelligence 113. 
57 re NS Distribution [1990] B.C.L.C. 169; re Charnley Davies Ltd [1990] B.C.C. 605. 
58 A Walters, ‘Statutory Erosion of Secured Creditors’ Rights: Some Insights from the United Kingdom’ 
[2015] University of Illinois Law Review, 543.  
59 J Moulton, ‘The Uncomfortable Edge of Propriety--Pre-packs or Just Stitch-ups?’ (2005) Recovery 
(Spring), 2 but see R Singh, ‘Jon Moulton Makes U-Turn on Pre-Packs’ (Accountancy Age, 18/06/2010). 
60 SIP 16 (2009, Version 1), 
https://www.r3.org.uk/media/documents/technical_library/SIPS/SIP%2016%20E&W.pdf accessed on 
11/12/2016. Prior to the 2015 reforms, it was revised in 2013. SIP 16 (2013, Version 2) 
https://www.r3.org.uk/media/documents/technical_library/SIPS/SIP_16_-
_Version_2_(effective_from_1_November_2013).pdf 
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B. The Modern Challenges of Business Rescue  
From the above, it is clear that the predominant business rescue process in England and 
Wales is contractualist in orientation. While England and Wales is the poster child for 
contractualist rescue systems, even traditionally more inclusive systems like that of the 
United States (‘US’) have experienced a surge in contractualist practices since the turn 
of the millennium.61 Scholars attribute the surge to the strengthening of senior lender 
control.62 By the time a company files for Chapter 11 protection, it is usually highly 
leveraged and lacking unencumbered assets.63 Finance is therefore required to keep the 
company running. The creditors who provide such finance are placed in prime position 
to control the ensuing sequence of events and consequently, the outcomes of the 
process. These lenders also provide finance for the company after the formal 
commencement of rescue called Debtor-in-Possession Finance (DIP Finance).  
Lenders who provide finance as the company approaches insolvency and after the 
commencement of the Chapter 11 process can push for the liquidation of all the assets 
of a distressed company through a s363 sale.64 In the US, unlike in England and Wales, 
a court order is required to sanction the sale.65 This gives the court some oversight 
                                                 
61 S Cook and G Franklyn, ‘In Re Skymall: The Crash of SkyMall and the Take Off of 363(b) Sales’ 
[2016] http://trace.tennessee.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1042&context=utk_studlawbankruptcy; J 
Lipson, ‘Governance in the Breach: Controlling Creditor Opportunism’ (2011) 84 Southern California LR 
1035; B Erens and D Hall, ‘Secured Lender Rights in 363 Sales and Related Issues of Lender Consent’ 
[2010] 18 ABI Law Review, 535.  
62 D Skeel Jr, ‘Creditors’ Ball: The “New” New Corporate Governance in Chapter 11’ (2003) 152 Uni 
Penn LR 917. 
63 R Thomas, ‘Tipping the Scales in Chapter 11: How Distressed Debt Investors Decrease Debtor 
Leverage and the Efficacy of Business Reorganization’ (2010) 27 Emory BDJ213;  
64 M Jacoby and E Janger, ‘Ice Cube Bonds: Allocating the Price of Process in Chapter 11 Bankruptcy’ 
[2014] 123 Yale Law Journal 862. 
65 11 USC, s363 (b) (1).  
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because of its discretion to approve or reject the application for sale.66 In practice, the 
court is constrained in the exercise of this discretion because the applicants typically 
present the case as one with great urgency.67 The distressed company is depicted as a 
melting ice-cube which is haemorrhaging value every day.68 To prevent further loss of 
value, the court feels compelled to sanction the sale, however reluctant the judge might 
be to do so.69 Such a sale, particularly where it is for all of the company’s assets, 
circumvents the traditional chapter 11 process and the protections that are in-built for 
the benefit of other stakeholders. Such that, like in England and Wales, the process is 
concluded with the participation, consent or at least acquiescence of the senior lenders 
and their nominees but not that of the other stakeholders.70      
It is difficult to determine empirically the reasons for pre-packs because the parties 
require no formal sanction from the court to undertake a pre-pack. We nevertheless can 
deduce some of the reasons for the use of pre-packs by assessing the available case law, 
empirical research and scholarly opinions.71  Many pre-pack cases fit within the ‘no 
time to spare’ or ‘melting ice-cubes’ category. The first cases of the pre-pack occurred 
within the first few weeks that the Insolvency Act 1986 came into force. On the 16th of 
January, 1987, less than three weeks after the new Act came into force, a petition was 
                                                 
66 re Lionel Corp., 722 F.2d 1063 (2d Cir 1983). 
67 D Skeel, ‘Competing Narratives in Corporate Bankruptcy: Debtor in Control vs. No Time to Spare’ 
[2009] Michigan State Law Review 1187. 
68 re On-Site Sourcing, Inc., 412 BR 817 (Bankr ED Va 2009); re Chrysler LLC, 576 F.3d 108 (2d Cir 
2009). 
69 n 64, 886 – 888.  
70 A Raykin, ‘Section 363 Sales: Mooting Due Process?’ [2012] 29 Emory Bankruptcy Development 
Journal 91; K Rosen, ‘Section 363 Has Become An Alternative That Poses Problems’ 
https://www.law360.com/articles/768436/section-363-has-become-an-alternative-that-poses-problems 
(accessed 09/04/2017); B Adler  V Capkun and L Weiss, ‘Value Destruction in the New Era of Chapter 
11’ [2013] 29 Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 461. 
71 The categories discussed below are not exhaustive. See also, n52 above, 32-33.  
15 
 
presented to place Charnley Davies Ltd into administration.72 By the 28th of January, 
1987, the administrator had entered into transactions for the sale of all three businesses 
without placing his proposals before the creditors of the company. Before entering into 
the sales agreements, the administrator made an application to the court for directions 
and also made an appointment to see the representatives of some of the creditors of the 
company for whom the company had acted as agent. The administrator cited insufficient 
time as the reason why he could not call a meeting of creditors.73 He argued that the 
company was in the insurance business and that such businesses depend on the goodwill 
of their clients and the willingness of the brokers and the staff to stay in the company’s 
employ. Thus, a timely sale was deemed necessary.74 
Some other pre-packs fall under the ‘lack of trading finance’ category.75 These pre-
packs are necessary because the administrators lack the funds to run the business while 
proposals are prepared and placed before the creditors for a vote. In DKLL Solicitors v 
HM Revenue & Customs76an application was made for the appointment of an 
administrator to give effect to a pre-pack by which the distressed business could be 
salvaged. The plan was to sell the business to a newly incorporated limited liability 
partnership as soon as administration commenced; before proposals could be placed 
before creditors. It was stated that the pre-pack was necessary because the funds by 
which an administrator could trade the business was not available. In England and 
Wales, many companies that go into administration are small or medium sized which 
find it difficult to access additional finance when distressed. Further, they tend to lack 
                                                 
72 In re Charnley Davies ltd (1988) 4 BCC 152 
73 Ibid, 155; [1990] BCC 605, 606. 
74 n 52 above, 32.  
75 Re Kayley Vending Ltd [2009] EWHC 904 (Ch); n 52 above, 32.  
76 [2007] EWHC 2067 (Ch). 
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unencumbered assets and the reality of the floating charge is that newly acquired assets 
come under the charge where carefully worded; hence, the need for quick sales.  
A third category of cases may be described as the ‘no better outcome’ pre-pack. In these 
cases, it is argued that the pre-pack offers the best outcome for the business.77 In re 
Kayley Vending Ltd78, a company which supplied cigarette vending machines to public 
houses became unable to pay its debts and faced the prospect of liquidation. The 
company had proposed a voluntary arrangement to its creditors but it had been rejected. 
The company applied for an administration order to enable a pre-pack sale of the 
business to potential buyers who had offered the highest value for the assets. The 
alternative was a piece-meal liquidation which would have generated less value for the 
creditors.79  
In 2003, the number of pre-packs rose sharply.80 Various explanations have been 
adduced for the upsurge. 81 In particular, there was an  increase in the use of asset-based 
finance.82 The upsurge in this type of finance was influenced by the outcomes of re 
Spectrum Plus83 which set-out the hurdles to creating a flexible but valid fixed charge 
over receivables; requiring the city to change its funding practices in that regard.84 
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These developments have introduced fragmentation into the financing of companies and 
complexities to the negotiations during business rescue.85 To prevent the costly 
consequences of complicated and potentially protracted negotiations, the pre-pack could 
be agreed before formal notification of the company’s insolvency to other stakeholders.  
In all categories of the pre-pack, as with other contractualist processes, the 
disenfranchisement of creditors does not extend to the senior lenders who directly or 
indirectly determine the outcomes of the process. This presents a problem which has 
been criticised by some scholars. It has been argued that senior lenders and their 
nominees will implement these private decisions even if they do not maximise the value 
locked in the assets of the distressed entity. Thus, they would, for example, be unwilling 
to delay the sale to recover a higher sum, even if it would result in higher returns for the 
other stakeholders.86 Similarly, they may choose a quick piece-meal sale over a going-
concern sale where the former returns a value that exceeds the secured loan.87 For that 
reason, Westbrook argues that senior lenders have a liquidation bias because they are 
likely to push for the liquidation of the assets where it is the most efficient option for 
them.88  
Ayotte and Morrison argue that the choice of outcomes is inversely related to the loan-
to-value ratio.89 Using empirical methods, they demonstrate that senior the lenders are 
more likely to seek quick enforcement where the value of the security will repay their 
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debt in full – in essence, where they are over-secured.90 The interests of the senior 
lenders are aligned with the other interests only where the value of the security will not 
repay the outstanding sums owed to the senior lender in full – where they are under-
secured. It is only in such cases that the senior lenders will seek to maximise the value 
in the assets.91 Given their perception of the state of affairs, these scholars grapple with 
the challenge of ensuring that the rescue process aligns the interests of the senior lenders 
and their nominees with those of the wider stakeholders in the distressed business. 
However, while scholars like Westbrook criticise the use of contractualist systems in 
general, others like Jacoby prefer to recommend changes that would protect the wider 
interests in the distressed company, while facilitating quick resolution of distress in 
cases that genuinely require it.92   
Another group of scholars contend that senior lenders have, in contrast to the above-
stated opinion, a going-concern bias.93 That school of thought argues that senior lenders 
are interested in the preservation of the going-concern of distressed businesses; not 
liquidation. Polo, for example, argues that they are likely to recover substantial 
proportions of the debt only where the going concern is preserved and adduces 
empirical evidence to that effect.94 In fact, this going-concern bias of senior lenders is 
said to be at the heart of the creation of innovative processes that facilitate rescue. One 
of these has been described by Franks and Sussman, who argue that senior lenders do 
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not enforce their security as soon as the debtor becomes distressed.95 They argue that 
these types of lenders tend to have a Business Support Unit through which distressed 
debtors can be supported.96 Viable entities are returned to branch while their less viable 
counterparts are sent into a debt recovery unit. Likewise, Armour asserts that the pre-
pack process was also developed on account of this going-concern preservation 
proclivity of senior lenders.97  
To increase the number of going-concerns that are preserved during administration, 
senior lenders in England and Wales and their nominees have, since the turn of the 
millennium, encouraged sales of distressed businesses to those previously-connected to 
the insolvent company where they are not responsible for the previous failure of the 
business.98 Previously-connected persons include the owners and/or management of the 
pre-distress company and those associated with them.99 Following the credit crisis, the 
armoury of the pre-pack was further extended to include the use of deferred 
consideration.100 By this, the business is sold to a new company which then undertakes 
to pay the purchase price within a specified period; typically less than 12 months but up 
to 36 months, in some cases.101  
The Wolverhampton study showed that the use of deferred consideration and sales to 
previously-connected persons are more likely in the case of pre-packs, where the 
decisions are made privately by the senior lenders and their nominees, than in the case 
                                                 
95 J Franks and O Sussman, ‘Financial Distress and Bank Restructuring of Small to Medium Size UK 
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97 n 81 above, 15.  
98 Ibid, 16.  
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of trading administrations where the unsecured creditors get a vote on the proposals of 
the administrator.102 As was stated in the Wolverhampton study:  
 Connected Sale and Deferred Consideration were 
present (either individually or together) in 77.0% 
of all cases, and hence both were absent in 23.0% 
of all cases. (This contrasts sharply with the 
Trading Administration data where both were 
absent in 63.4% of all cases – see analysis in 
Section B4 below). 
 Both Connected Sale and Deferred Consideration 
were present in 44.6% of all cases, (as opposed to 
only 8.6% in the trading administration data).103 
An empirical study of prepacks in 2007 revealed, however, that 48.6% of businesses 
rescued by previously-connected persons failed subsequently; in contrast to 28.5% of 
those rescued by their non-connected counterparts.104 Similarly, the Wolverhampton 
study found that 30% of businesses rescued by pre-pack sales to previously-connected 
persons failed within the subsequent 36 months; as opposed to 18.4% of those sold to 
their non-connected counterparts.105 Further, the Wolverhampton study found that 39% 
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of the businesses rescued through deferred consideration failed again within 36 months; 
in contrast to 9.7% of those saved without deferred consideration.106  
These recidivism figures introduce another element to the criticisms of the pre-pack. 
The innovations introduced by senior lenders and their nominees have been implicated 
in the subsequent failure of rescued businesses. Further, these two innovations are more 
likely to be used where the other creditors are not given a vote on the administrator’s 
proposals. As stated in the Graham review: 
Even though at face value it appears that a higher 
percentage of pre-pack purchases subsequently failed than 
did trading administrations, this seems to be because a 
higher percentage of pre-packs have characteristics 
associated with failure (i.e. connected sales and 
deferred consideration). When controlling for these 
factors, and comparing pre-packs and trading 
administrations on a like-for-like basis, the data shows that 
the odds of failure are lower for pre-packs.107 
It is argued the mechanisms introduced by senior lenders and their nominees introduce 
complex problems. Much of the debate on rescue processes have focused on the 
misalignment of interests between the senior lenders and other stakeholders in the 
company. This article focuses on another but related issue. It discusses the tension 
between value maximisation in distressed entities and the survivability of rescued 
                                                 
106 Ibid, A4.1.2. 
107 n 5 above, 7.90; emphasis mine. 
22 
 
businesses. As can be observed from the earlier discussion, the pre-pack undoubtedly 
facilitates business rescue in some cases. Nevertheless, the recidivism figures highlight 
the tension between value maximisation in distressed entities and post-rescue survival. 
It is argued that this tension goes to the very heart of business rescue because the figures 
reveal that sales to previously-connected persons even where coupled with the 
traditional administration at which unsecured creditors vote on the administrator’s 
proposals are still likely to fail subsequently. Similarly, sales with deferred 
consideration even where coupled with traditional administration or with sales to those 
without previous connections to the business will result in subsequent failure. The 
challenge therefore is how the policy-maker can ensure that the rescue process balances 
the quest for value-maximisation with the desire to have sustained business rescues. A 
balanced system will not only achieve the broader goals of rescue but will also reduce 
recidivism and promote trust in the rescue system as a whole. It is with this challenge 
that the rest of The article grapples.  
C. Striking a Balance between Value Maximization and Future Survival in the 
Rescue Process 
As can be expected, the Graham review was concerned about the rate of recidivism.108 
To that end, she made recommendations targeted at recidivism reduction. These 
recommendations were predicated on the normative opinion that there is an inherently 
future-focused element of business rescue.109 They signify a long-term view of the 
rescue practice and its purpose, rather than a short-term view which focuses solely on 
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the conclusion and execution of the business sale. Indeed, it is difficult to deny the 
future-focused element of rescue. Short-term rescues trigger criticisms of debt-dumping 
and phoenixism which ultimately undermine trust in the rescue system.110 Debt-
dumping refers to the practice whereby those with previous connections to distressed 
business shed pre-distress debts by liquidating the distressed corporate shell and buying 
back the businesses through a pre-pack.111 Phoenixism refers to the rising of ‘dead’ 
business from the ashes of its failure through another corporate form.112 Both concepts 
together suggest that the practice whereby businesses are rescued for a short period of 
time only to fail again, to, perhaps, be rescued portends badly for business rescue more 
broadly.  
Typically, the focus at business rescue is on maximising the pie in the interest of the 
stakeholders.113 It follows that the alignment of interests has attracted intense scholarly 
debate.114 Regard for the future survival of the rescued business has attracted 
comparably less attention.115 Given that rescue has a future-focused element, it is 
important that greater regard is accorded the discussion on how the rescue system can 
balance both roles of the rescue system. To that end, practices which are known to 
contribute to the subsequent failure of rescued businesses ought to be reconsidered. That 
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said, much difficulty awaits those who wish to keep contractualist practices but bring 
them within the balanced view of rescue. Ms Graham found herself faced with these 
difficulties in 2014-2015 when she sought to recommend the preservation of the pre-
pack practice while seeking to infuse the need for long-term focus for business rescue. 
Ultimately Ms Graham suggested reforms which she believed would make the pre-pack 
practice more future-focused.  
The Graham review attributed the subsequent failure of businesses sold to previously-
connected persons to the difficulty of the system to sift viable from unviable entities.116 
For that reason, it proposed a viability report to be drafted by an independent expert, if 
the business was to be sold to those with previous connections to the failed entity.117 It 
also recommended that the viability report be supported by a viability statement which 
would indicate the problems of failed entity and outline the actions to be taken by 
directors going forward.118 The report proposed no reforms to the use of deferred 
consideration, however. The viability report and viability statement are voluntary but 
operate on a Comply or Explain basis. Where provided, they would be included in the 
dossier of documents provided to the unsecured creditors after the sale. If the 
previously-connected persons elect not to provide them, then they should explain their 
reasons and these should be brought to the notice of the creditors.119 The Graham 
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reforms have been introduced into the revised SIP 16 which came into effect on the 1st 
of November 2015.120  
It is argued that the view of rescue which seeks to balance value maximization with 
future survival is the preferred view of rescue. For that reason, the Graham review is 
commended for introducing regard for the survivability of rescued businesses into the 
rescue debate in England and Wales. The recommendations become more important 
when one explores the practice that has been cobbled together by senior lenders and 
their nominees in the shadow of the law, it is clear that questions relating to future 
survival have no place. In fact, as will be seen shortly, neither the senior lender nor the 
practitioner is interested in any other goal but value maximisation. It is the 
responsibility of the buyer to consider the potential survival of the rescued business. 
Perhaps the time has come to clarify or expand the role of the buyer in the rescue 
process; particularly in the case where they are previously connected to the distressed 
entity.  
It is trite that only viable entities ought to be rescued.121 One would expect therefore, 
that there would be a clear finding of viability for distressed businesses that would be 
rescued. The business rescue process created by the senior lenders and their nominees 
does not to include that requirement. A recent report indicates that it is unlikely that the 
senior lender will investigate the viability of the distressed entity. In 2014, Clifford 
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Chance published a report122 in response to the earlier published Tomlinson report123 on 
the treatment of distressed businesses in England and Wales. The former revealed more 
details about the bank unit to which distressed entities are transferred.124 In RBS, this 
was called the Business Restructuring Group (BRG). One of the reasons why a branch 
referred a distressed business to the BRG was for a clear determination of its viability, 
amongst other things. For that reason, it was that unit that was empowered to engage 
independent experts to assess the debtor but that tended not to happen. Typically, a 
desktop viability review was undertaken by the relationship manager.125 As was stated: 
‘The need for independent expertise may be one of the 
factors triggering the transfer to BRG. We note from our 
review of the files and discussions with the bank’s 
employees that apart from solicitors undertaking security 
reviews, independent experts are not frequently engaged 
by BRG and those that are engaged typically have a 
limited remit. A full independent business review is 
rarely undertaken for SME customers.’126 
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It is unlikely that the practitioner will conduct a business review either, when appointed. 
The Insolvency Act 1986 does not require the administrator to undertake to determine 
the viability of distressed businesses. In fact, the Act does not require the administrator 
to rescue only viable entities or to dissuade previously-connected persons from rescuing 
non-viable businesses. The value-maximising goal of the administrator encourages her 
to accept the highest value offered for the distressed business, regardless of the 
credibility of the prospects of the rescue. As was stated in the Graham review: 
Insolvency practitioners with whom I spoke made clear to 
me that an administrator of an insolvent company 
cannot have regard to the likely survival of the new 
company. Their legal responsibility is with old company’s 
creditors.127   
The responsibility for determining viability falls on the buyer, therefore. It is expected 
that in instances where a distressed entity will be purchased by third parties, they will 
determine viability before the purchase and make an arm’s length decision. For 
example, Kohlberg Kravis Roberts (‘KKR’), one of the pioneers of the leveraged buy-
out business, noted that as a buyer, it had to investigate the target company and its 
business thoroughly.128 This may be one of the reasons why the companies rescued by 
those without previous connections fail at almost half the rate of those rescued by those 
with previous connections. It is therefore important that previously-connected persons 
are clearly required to investigate the viability of the business prior to the rescue.  
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It is doubtful however, whether previously-connected persons can determine viability 
objectively. In fact, scholars like Baird and Jackson argue that they cannot; hence, they 
insist that auctions to third parties are the best way to determine viability.129 The 
Graham review similarly takes the view that previously-connected persons may be 
unable to determine viability objectively. For that reason, it recommended that the 
viability report be produced by an independent expert.130  In support of that 
recommendation, it is argued that there are important reasons for which an independent 
assessment of viability ought to be required when the business is to be purchased by 
previously-connected persons, the answers to which can be found in behavioural 
studies.  
Behavioural scientists have demonstrated that decision-making is typically affected by a 
host of systematic errors in reasoning: biases.131 People are highly sensitive to loss.132 
Many make decisions on short term considerations; their reference point typically being 
the status quo.133 Managers in particular, tend to be over- confident of their abilities to 
turn distressed companies around.134 As Polo has stated, the companies which are pre-
packed tend to be small.135 This means that there is a perfect relationship between 
ownership and management. The owners/managers would be the previously-connected 
persons to whom the distressed entities are sold. They face the prospect of losing the 
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businesses that they have built from scratch, as well as their means of livelihood.136 
Thus, loss aversion may impel them to seek to preserve the status-quo by preserving 
even lame ducks, if given the chance.137 When we also consider the fact that they are 
also likely to be buoyed by the optimism that they can turn the businesses around, it is 
clear that they are likely to accept the challenge of the second chance even with 
businesses that are not necessarily viable; hence the importance of an independent 
finding of viability.  
It is common to see the argument that companies which require rescue are merely 
financially, not economically distressed.138 It is more likely, however, that even 
financially distressed businesses also have operational problems that must be resolved, 
if they are to carry on successfully post-rescue. This observation is hardly novel. Arthur 
Dewing, a leading finance scholar, highlighted the failure to properly diagnose the 
debtor’s operational problems as a reason for the subsequent failure of rescued entities, 
as far back as the nineteenth century.139 Similarly, turn-around doctors state that an 
assessment of the state of the business, the causes of the distress and the operational 
needs going forward are crucial to the formation of a sustained recovery strategy for 
distressed entities.140 They state that the exercise is deemed successful when the 
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company recovers from its steady plunge and its fortunes are reversed.141 KKR, our 
example of a third-party buyer, has stated that it typically had to identify the areas in 
which the distressed entities it had purchased could improve their cash-flows if it was to 
make profits in its investment; given that it made profits only where its investments 
turned over a profit. That required the retention of some of the old management and the 
engagement of other professionals with requisite experience to oversee the process of 
drafting and executing a recovery plan.142 In addition, recent empirical studies reiterate 
the finding of Hotchkiss, that businesses which go into a formal insolvency process 
show obvious signs of economic distress in the period leading to the filing.143  
Clearly, it is important to investigate the reasons for the distress and create a plan to 
prevent future distress but these requirements for sustained rescues are not addressed in 
the process created by the senior lenders. The Clifford Chance report identified above 
shows the difficulties the bank has dealing with operational, not financial issues.144 It 
indicates that a restructuring strategy is generated only for those debtors that are deemed 
viable by the bank but these return to branch, they do not go into the insolvency 
system.145 Even in that event, much of the restructuring involved financial issues, not 
operational. The entities that go to sale have no plans created to fix their operational 
problems. The Insolvency Act 1986 makes no requirement for an operational plan. The 
practitioners have constantly stressed that they are not responsible for the future of the 
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rescued business; their responsibility being to maximise recoveries for the creditors of 
the distressed entity. They will therefore not put forward plans for operational changes. 
Hence, the responsibility for operational rescue falls on the buyer. The viability 
statement recommended by the Graham review is therefore essential for the rescue 
process. It will improve the chances that the future operational needs of the business 
will be considered and outlined.  
Even if we focus solely on financial distress and the financial structure of the rescued 
entity, we see that there are serious problems. 39% of pre-packs rescued with deferred 
consideration are failing again, whereas only 9.7% of their counter-parts sold without 
deferred consideration are failing again.146 In trading administrations, 37.5% of those 
rescued with deferred consideration are failing again, while 14.5% of their counterparts 
fail again with 36 months. It is therefore important that we focus in greater detail on the 
use of deferred consideration. It is important first to deal with its nature. When 
consideration is deferred, it means that the price to be paid for the purchase of the 
distressed business is not paid contemporaneously with the transfer.147 The new 
company undertakes to pay the sum within the period specified or agreed by the parties. 
Put differently, the new company incurs a debt because of its purchase of the business. 
Debt, as we know, is fixed cost which must be paid regardless of the company’s profit 
margin.  Deferred consideration tends to be secured in the case of pre-packs.148 The 
Graham review was concerned with the ability of the new company to repay the debt. 149 
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It found that the debt was typically repaid within 12 months by most companies.150 It is 
clear however, that most of them failed with the next 12 to 24 months after completing 
the payment.151 Interestingly, the Graham report chose not to make any 
recommendations in that regard.  
When we examine rescue processes over the past century, we find that as far back as the 
nineteenth century, distressed businesses have been rescued in circumstances in which 
some debt is carried forward.152 By the last decade of that century, however, 
stakeholders interested in more sustained rescues came to recognise that the business 
could only survive where it carried forward lower thresholds of debt than had been the 
practice.153 They recognised also, that the debt carried forward had to be brought within 
reasonable percentage of the projected earnings of the rescued business.154 In addition, 
that the period following the completion of the rescue process was the most crucial.155 
We can apply this received wisdom to the situation in England and Wales. It is unclear 
whether the amount of deferred consideration is calculated in relation to the future 
earning capacity of the rescued business. It is possible and in fact likely, that the rescued 
businesses are fatally leveraged going forward. Further, it is important to consider 
whether the allocated time frame within which the deferred sum is extracted is adequate. 
Ideally, a fair balance ought to be reached between the desire of the secured lenders and 
other creditors to be repaid and the broader desire to have sustained rescue.  
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The question that follows is to whom to allocate the responsibility for a fair 
consideration of both the interests of the beneficiaries of the deferred consideration – 
typically the senior lenders – and of the rescued business going forward. As with the 
viability and operational questions, the senior lender is obliged to consider only its 
interests. The insolvency practitioners who would be in a position, given their 
experience, to give relevant advice to the business carried forward are not obligated to 
encourage those rescuing the business to negotiate a better deal. In fact, they are likely 
to take advantage of such a deal if it results in higher returns to the pre-distress 
creditors.156 As was stated in the Graham review: 
Old company’s creditors are best served by the 
administrator negotiating the best possible deal with the 
purchaser (and the administrator cannot concern 
him/herself with whether or not the purchaser cannot 
afford it). 157   
The responsibility therefore falls on the buyer. Where they do not seek adequate 
independent advice, the business is likely to fail again. Where almost 1 in every 2 
businesses that are rescued by deferred consideration fail again, it is important to 
reconsider the extant approach to the use of deferred consideration in the rescue process.  
                                                 
156 n 5 above, 7.44. 
157 n5 above, 7.44; emphasis mine.  
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The Graham review placed its recommendations on a Comply or Explain basis. 
Generally, the Comply or Explain approach has its advantages.158 It is flexible. It 
enables companies to focus on substance, while operating at their own pace. As stated 
already, a large proportion of the companies that use the pre-pack sale to previously-
connected persons tend to be SMEs. They would benefit from the proportionality of the 
Comply or Explain approach; at least in terms of cost. Thus, a voluntary approach is 
understandable. Comply or Explain is not without its challenges, however. Considerable 
institutional support is required to enable the system work effectively.159 In corporate 
governance through which this approach was launched, the parties to whom the 
information is to be disclosed are empowered to take concrete action against the subject 
of the duty where compliance is weak.160 In the case of business rescue, the legal rights 
and powers of the pre-distress stakeholders terminate after the rescue proceedings. They 
have no legal rights against the new company even where the viability report and 
viability statement are insufficient.  
Further, in Corporate Governance, there is the Financial Reporting Council (‘FRC’) 
which, amongst others, engages in oversight functions and contributes actively to the 
development of various elements of the corporate governance process.161 For example, 
the FRC has been involved in monitoring explanations and the quest to improve their 
                                                 
158 ICAEW, ‘When is comply or explain the right approach?’ http://www.icaew.com/-
/media/corporate/files/technical/corporate-governance/dialogue-in-corporate-governance/icaew-tl-q3-
web.ashx?la=en accessed 11/12/2016,  
159 Ibid.  
160 FRC Response to the European Commission Green Paper on the EU Corporate Governance 
Framework – Financial Reporting Council Response Paper, July 2011.  
161 Financial Reporting Council, UK Corporate Governance Code, https://www.frc.org.uk/Our-
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accessed 11/12/2016. 
35 
 
quality.162 The Graham Review recommended the creation of a body of experts to 
oversee the decision to pre-pack, called the Pre-pack Pool.163 While the pre-pack pool 
may exercise oversight over issues relating to the transparency of the decision to pre-
pack where approached, its functions do not extend to matters related to recidivism. It 
has no oversight functions over the independent viability report or the viability 
statement or the explanations where those are presented in lieu.164 The administrator 
does not review the documents either. Her role is to present them to the creditors.  
Crucial elements of Comply or Explain are absent. For that reason, it is doubtful that it 
can operate successfully in the realm of business rescue. It is argued, therefore, that the 
Comply or Explain route ought not to be the recommended approach. The following 
section proposes alternative reforms that would better promote due consideration for the 
future survival of the rescued entity.  
D. Proposals to Improve the Effectiveness of the Business Rescue Process 
Polo has argued that both the initial and subsequent failure of businesses sold to 
previously-connected persons are not related to their misdeeds but attributable to the 
fact their businesses are much smaller than those sold to their non-connected 
counterparts, operate in human-capital intensive industries and lack alternative 
prospects.165 The assumption appears to be that such businesses would struggle more in 
comparison to their larger counterparts following the completion of the rescue 
                                                 
162 Financial Reporting Council, What Constitutes an Explanation Under 'Comply or Explain'? Report of 
Discussions between Companies and Investors’, February 2012.  
163 n 5 above, p59; SIP 16.   
164 n Error! Bookmark not defined. above, 602-603. 
165 n 94 above, 23-26.  
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process.166  It may be that our smallest reorganising businesses need more guidance if 
they are to effect sustainable rescues. They clearly do not receive the said guidance 
from the senior lenders or the administrators. Consequently, it is argued that the 
independent viability review and viability statement on the future steps to be taken by 
the directors should be made mandatory whenever previously-connected persons are to 
rescue a distressed entity. On one hand, such an approach will signal to directors that a 
timely and pro-active approach to rescue is important; on the other, it will enhance the 
chances that they will be able to access relevant independent advice. 
As we have seen, deferred consideration appears to be even more likely to contribute to 
the subsequent failure of the company as 39% of the pre-packs characterised by 
deferred consideration fail subsequently; while 37.5% of trading administrations 
characterised by deferred consideration fail subsequently.167 As has been indicated 
above, it is important to focus on the earnings to deferred consideration ratio and the 
time-span for repayment. As it currently stands, it is unclear whether there is a clear link 
between the percentage of new earnings which the company can safely pay towards the 
repayment of the debt, while maintaining a good profit margin, and the amount of 
deferred consideration carried forward by the new company. Neither the Insolvency Act 
1986 nor SIP 16 includes such a requirement. As we have also seen, neither the senior 
lender nor the administrators are obliged to dissuade the debtor from undertaking a fatal 
amount of leverage going forward. It is therefore recommended that the SIP 16 and the 
Insolvency Act 1986, ought to be amended to require the buyers to demonstrate that 
they have taken independent advice on the earnings to deferred consideration ratio and 
                                                 
166 Ibid, 25. 
167 n 53 above, A4.1.2; B4.1.2.  
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the time-span negotiated for the repayment of the debt. This requirement should apply 
even where the buyers do not have previous connections with the distressed company 
because the Wolverhampton study showed that recidivism related to deferred 
consideration is not limited to situations where the buyer had a prior relationship to the 
failed entity.  
One of the challenges that would face previously-connected persons who wish to rescue 
distressed business in a regime that requires a mandatory viability review and 
operational statement is that of cost. Professionals must be paid at a point when there is 
little or no money available. Such requirements are likely to dissuade some of such 
persons from undertaking rescues. These arguments must however be balanced by the 
clear recognition that the failure to create a viable plan is likely to result in future failure 
of the rescued business, the costs of which will be borne by the future stakeholders. One 
method by which to reduce overall costs is to combine both the operational and viability 
statements, particularly in the case of smaller businesses. It is important however, that 
they have an objective review of their plans, as well as assistance in developing viable 
plans. The independent expert is not expected to create or guarantee the creation of a 
fool-proof plan. What is required is a statement on whether the proposed plan is likely 
to facilitate the future survival of the rescued entity. It is expected that where the 
business really is viable and has a clear plan for future survival, the buyer will be able to 
access funds to cover the cost of the viability/operational statement. Also, where such a 
requirement will deter spurious rescue attempts, it is a welcome, rather than a worrying 
development. 
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There are of course other challenges facing the rescue system as a whole. The scope of 
the floating charge and its ability to cover after acquired assets is one important aspect. 
Access to rescue finance which would facilitate the rescue process is another. Rescue 
finance would cover some of the additional costs to be introduced by an obligatory 
system described in this article. Where the additional powers are given to facilitate 
rescue by previously-connected persons, it becomes even more important to impose 
clear responsibilities on them in the interests of sustained rescues. These are issues 
which go to the very heart of rescue and the nature of the system that operates in a 
particular jurisdiction. These issues, as well as those discussed in this article, ought to 
be addressed in a more comprehensive debate on the nature of rescue and the features of 
our preferred rescue process. Such a discussion would hopefully prompt a more 
comprehensive review of the system; an outcome which is preferred to the piece-meal 
changes that have taken place. It is important that such debate and reform recognise the 
need for a future-focused rescue system which seeks to balance value maximization 
with the survivability of the rescued business, however.  
E. Conclusion 
It is generally accepted that the value in financially distressed businesses ought to be 
maximised for the benefit of all pre-distress stakeholders. Rescue systems and other 
contractualist processes have been developed to achieve that goal. In England and 
Wales, both the administration process and its pre-pack variant have been created with 
value maximization in mind. Together, they account for the greater proportion of 
business rescues; with more business rescues effected through by the latter than the 
former. Pre-packs and similar contractualist processes have thrived on the argument that 
39 
 
many of these companies require quick sales to stem the haemorrhage of value 
following the public acknowledgement of the distress; particularly in instances in which 
the companies are unable to access trading finance.  
As with contractualist systems generally, the pre-pack process is skewed in the interest 
of the senior lenders who exert considerable control over its commencement, 
administration and outcomes. They have therefore been criticised by those who argue 
that senior lenders and their nominees lack the incentive to maximise the value in the 
assets; particularly where they are over-secured. A competing view argues that these 
processes reduce the cost of financial distress. Further, that in most cases, the senior 
lender is under-secured and so would typically seek to maximise value. While such 
discussions are pertinent, it is equally important to consider the effect of these 
contractualist processes on the post-rescue survivability of distressed entities.  
Pre-packs tend to be augmented by sales to persons with previous connections to the 
distressed entity and sales with the aid of deferred consideration to improve the chances 
of achieving going-concern sales. However, both factors have been associated with the 
likelihood that the rescued business will fail again. Almost half of the businesses 
rescued with deferred consideration and almost a third of those rescued by previously-
connected persons fail within the next 36 months. A distressed business is almost twice 
as likely to fail again within the stated period when rescued by previously-connected 
persons, than when rescued by their unconnected counterparts and almost 4 times as 
likely to fail when rescued with deferred consideration, than when it is not so rescued. 
With almost 8 out of every 10 going-concern sales, having at least one of these factors, 
the policy-maker was right to be concerned.  
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The recidivism-related reforms which ensued were predicated on the notion that there is 
an inherently future-focused element of rescue. Thus, it is important for the rescue 
system to balance value-maximization with the prospect of future survival. This is 
particularly important if the system is to inspire the trust of wider stakeholders. It is on 
that basis that the processes created by the senior lenders and their nominees should be 
examined. While some of their practices are innovative, they do not seek to balance 
these two goals of rescue. Recent studies on the Business Support Unit to which 
distressed entities are sent before formal entry into the rescue process show that senior 
lenders do not make detailed investigations into the viability of the business or its 
operational needs going forward. Similarly, the Insolvency Act does not require the 
practitioner to undertake either inquiry. What’s more, practitioners have indicated that 
their responsibilities are to the extant stakeholders, at best. In practice, it is common 
knowledge however, that they tend to act in the interest of the senior lender. In either 
case, they are past-focused, seeking to maximise recoveries, not future-focused to guide 
the distressed business to a viable second chance.  
Ultimately, the responsibility falls on the buyer to consider the future survival of the 
rescued business. While third parties are better able to make arm’s length decisions 
however, previously-connected persons appear to require additional help. It is therefore 
pertinent to set out additional responsibilities for these parties where they wish to rescue 
distressed businesses. For that reason, The article agrees with the introduction of the 
independent viability report and viability statement which look to the future of the 
rescued business. Nevertheless, given the difficulties of enforcing the Comply or 
Explain method, The article argues that the requLikirements ought to be obligatory. 
Unlike the Graham review, The article argues that the reforms should extend to the use 
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of deferred consideration. It argues that the buyer ought to demonstrate that it has 
obtained independent advice on the earning-projection-to-deferred consideration ratio, 
as well as on the time-span negotiated for the repayment of the debt. Further, that this 
requirement should apply even where the parties have no previous connections with the 
distressed company because failure related to deferred consideration is not limited to 
cases where the buyer had previous connections with the distressed entity.  
The article recognises that its recommendations could increase the costs of the rescue 
process and deter some rescue attempts. It is important to recognise that these are issues 
on which the buyer is already expected to obtain independent advice. All that The 
article recommends is a demonstration that the said advice has been sought and 
obtained. The case for independent advice is strengthened by the fact that the buyer 
cannot or ought not to rely on the insolvency practitioner whose remit is to seek the 
highest value, not help the buyer develop a sound plan. Similarly, the practitioner is not 
obliged to advice the buyer on the amount of leverage to take forward or the repayment 
schedule that is best suited to the needs of the rescued business. Nevertheless, The 
article argues that the cost can be reduced for small businesses by fusing the viability 
report and viability statement. Further, that the buyer should be able to access funds 
with which to pay for the advice if it can convince potential lenders of the soundness of 
the business and its prospects. To the extent that the recommendations dissuade buyers 
with spurious rescue plans however, then they are even more welcome.  
The pre-pack process is an important feature of the rescue process. Nonetheless, it is 
important to scale back elements that are detrimental to effective business rescue. This 
article argues that effective rescue balances value maximization with the future survival 
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of rescued entities. To enhance the chances of the latter, there are several changes that 
would be necessary which cannot be discussed satisfactorily in this article. It is 
important however, that any changes to the rescue process should include the 
clarification of the duties of the buyer and the responsibilities which they should 
undertake if the desired balance is to be achieved.  
